# Architecture ## Online authentication ```text LogonUI -> SGU Credential Provider (SecureString) -> HTTPS 1.1 + client certificate -> SGU Auth Broker -> SGU IIS NTLM endpoint (original password) -> minimum SGU profile metadata (same authenticated response) -> Active Directory (same original password + optional profile) <- domain + canonical username; never a password -> Windows credential serialization (original SecureString) -> LSA / Kerberos / cached domain logon ``` The broker performs the NTLM exchange and AD update before returning `200 OK`. It follows only HTTPS redirects whose host appears in `AllowedRedirectHosts`, which prevents credential forwarding to an unexpected redirect target. HTTP/1.1 is forced because NTLM authentication is connection-bound. The logical GET is sent directly to the administrative incident overview for `AD` identities, the student information page for `AL` identities, or the portal menu for `DO` identities. NTLM may still require its normal challenge/response round trips on that connection. The broker keeps any transient portal cookie in an in-memory per-request container; it is never persisted or returned to the client. ## Offline authentication ```text Broker timeout, TLS failure, 429, or 5xx -> provider preserves the entered username/password -> Windows LSA validates against AD or its cached domain verifier -> only the last AD password succeeds ``` An explicit `400` or `401` from the broker is different: the provider displays an error and does not serialize the rejected credential. ## Account synchronization The broker normalizes the username to uppercase and accepts exactly two letters plus six digits. It searches `BaseDn` by `sAMAccountName`, creates the user when absent, moves it to the mapped OU when required, sets `userPrincipalName`, and passes the submitted password directly to ADSI `SetPassword`. When the authenticated HTML exposes recognized stable IDs, the broker also updates the applicable `displayName`, `givenName`, `sn`, `mail`, `title`, `department`, `employeeType`, `employeeID`, `streetAddress`, `l`, `st`, and `postalCode` attributes. Administrative and student numbers must match the six numeric digits of the requested identity before any scraped metadata is trusted. Student faculty/department is deliberately left unset because the verified page does not expose it. Missing metadata does not clear existing AD values and never changes the password outcome. Human-readable SGU values are decoded with BOM/header/meta detection, strict UTF-8 validation, and a Windows-1252 fallback for the legacy portal. Names and titles are normalized with Spanish-aware casing; particles such as `de`, `del` and `de la` remain lowercase and Unicode accents are preserved. Values that still contain the Unicode replacement character are not written to AD. When `RemoteDesktopGroupDn` is configured, the broker also adds each successfully synchronized SGU user to that dedicated AD security group. The laboratory Windows client maps the group into its local **Remote Desktop Users** group. Every synchronized user also receives `Universidad La Salle` in the AD `company` attribute unless deployment configuration supplies another default. The generic SGU credential is rendered as a dedicated branded tile instead of being grouped below the anonymous **Other user** tile. Machine policy assigns the SGU CLSID as the default provider while retaining the built-in Microsoft password provider. It enumerates one `CPFT_TILE_IMAGE` and places the `CPFT_LARGE_TEXT` heading immediately after it with `CPFS_DISPLAY_IN_BOTH`, matching Microsoft's supported field ordering. LogonUI owns field typography: on Windows 10 and 11, the account-name title used by **Other user** is shell UI, not a style that a generic Credential Provider can request. Do not add a second tile image or a synthetic Windows account to imitate that title. The managed hierarchy is rooted at `OU=Usuarios-SGU`: `Docentes`, `Alumnos`, and `Administrativos` are direct child OUs beneath it. Per-user synchronization is serialized inside the broker to prevent concurrent create/reset races. Production deployments should run the broker as a gMSA with delegated create-user, move-user, write-property, enable-account, and reset-password rights limited to `Usuarios-SGU` and its three managed child OUs. The lab can run it on the domain controller as LocalSystem.